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RECENT CASES
involvement, are needed to clarify the Shapiro holding, and should be ex-
pected in the future.
CLARK HARWELL COLE
WRONGFUL CONCEPTION AS A
CAUSE OF ACTION AND
DAMAGES RECOVERABLE
Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic1
After the birth of their seventh child, Mr. and Mrs. Sherlock decided
that Mr. Sherlock should undergo a vasectomy. Dr. Stratte performed the
operation at the defendant clinic, and advised avoidance of sexual rela-
tions without contraception until post-operative testing proved the pro-
cedure successful. Following the first test of Mr. Sherlock's semen, Dr.
Stratte informed him by telephone that the results were "negative."2
Believing the operation to have been successful, the Sherlocks resumed
normal sexual relations without contraceptives. When Mrs. Sherlock
began to miss her menstrual periods several months later, a second test was
made, revealing that the sterilization had been ineffective. Mrs. Sherlock
was pregnant, and in due course she delivered a normal, healthy baby boy.
The Sherlocks brought suit, claiming that the birth of their child was
the result of Dr. Stratte's negligent post-operative testing. s Tried as an or-
1. 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977).
2. Actually, the test results indicated "that Mr. Sherlock's semen had a
sperm density of 5 to 10 sperm cells per high-powered microscope field and that
50 percent of these were motile." Id. at 171. From this information, little can be
deduced about Sherlock's degree of fertility since many factors besides sperm den-
sity are important and "there is considerable debate as to the lower level of 'nor-
mal' and 'fertile."' 1 M. CAMPBELL, CAMPBELL'S UROLOGY 736 (J. Harrison, et.
al. ed. 1978). However, although some authorities will tolerate the presence of
nonmotile sperm in post-operative samples under certain ccinditions, see
Urquhart-Hay, Immediate Sterility After Vasectomy, 81 N. Z. MED. J. 11 (1975),
the presence of any motile sperm cells usually indicates that the operation has
failed for some reason, Freeman, Vasectomy in General Practice, 214" PRACTI-
TIONER 401, 405 (1975). Therefore, Sherlock's sperm sample could not have been
considered negative.
3. The Sherlock's also alleged that the vasectomy operation itself had been
negligently performed, but the court did not discuss this aspect of the suit, merely
noting the difficulty of proving this allegation. Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260
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dinary medical negligence action and submitted to the jury on general
negligence instructions, the case resulted in a verdict for the Sherlocks of
$19,500. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Minnesota held that when the
birth of a normal healthy child was proximately caused by a physician's
negligence, damages could be recovered for medical expenses, the
mother's pain and suffering, loss of consortium, and the reasonable cost of
rearing the child, less the value of the child's aid, comfort, and society.
Sherlock illustrates the elements of a small but growing line of cases
referred to as "wrongful birth"4 actions (not to be confused with "wrong-
ful life" actions).5 In the typical situation giving rise to such a case, a nor-
4. The proper appellation of this group of cases has not yet been agreed
upon. The term used by the Sherlock court, "wrongful conception," would apply
to the bulk of these cases because it accurately indicates that the defendant's
wrongful act is alleged to be the proximate cause of the conception itself.
However, there is at least one case in which similar recovery was held allowable
after a physician performed an unsuccessful abortion. There the child had been
conceived before the alleged negligence. Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698,
127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976). In addition, plaintiffs in "wrongful conception" have
sought recovery based on the failure of the physician to diagnose an existing
pregnancy or disease in time for an abortion to be performed. See, e.g., Howard
v. Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109, 366 N.E.2d 64, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1977) (recovery
denied); Rieck v. Medical Protec. Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974)
(recovery denied). See generally, Annot., 83 A.L.R.3d 15 (1978). As a more in-
clusive term, "wrongful birth" may be preferable.
5. Distinguishing between wrongful birth and wrongful life actions is vital
because courts have treated the two much differently. While several jurisdictions
have accepted the idea of wrongful birth, only one case has recognized a cause of
action for wrongful life. Park v. Chessin, 60 App. Div. 2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110
(1977), noted in 44 Mo. L. REV. 117 (1979). Although the subject is too compli-
cated to discuss at length here, some of the more basic features of the wrongful
life claim can be noted. The plaintiff is a child who alleges damages because the
defendant allowed him to be born. In contrast to ordinary prenatal tort cases
there is no assertion that the defendant caused any physical injury; birth itself is
the injury. In essence the child contends it would be better off unborn.
The suit may be by a bastard against its parents for being forced to endure
the stigma of its origin. See, e.g., Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 111. App. 2d 240, 190
N.E.2d 849 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964). Commonly, however, the
suit is directed against a physician for negligence which allowed the child to be
born. See, e.g., Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967) (failure to
inform mother that rubella could cause birth defects, thereby precluding an in-
formed decision not to obtain an abortion).
With the one exception mentioned above, courts have consistently refused to
award damages for such claims, although often recognizing that a tort had been
committed. The reasons usually cited are public policy against considering the
gift of life an injury, the impossibility of weighing existence against nonexistence
to establish the amount of damages; and a fear of increased litigation. See Note,
A Cause of Action for Wrongful Life: [A Suggested Analysis], 55 MINN. L. REV.
58 (1970); Note, Torts- WrongfulBirth and Wrongful Life, 44 Mo. L. REV. 167
(1979).
Since both wrongful life and wrongful birth actions arise from similar situa-
tions and in fact often are alleged in the same case, it is easy to understand how
they may be confused, but a claim by the parents is not one for wrongful life.
[Vol. 4590
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mal, healthy baby is born as a result of the negligence, fraud, or breach of
contract of a third party. Second, the parents of the child, as opposed to
the child itself, sue as plaintiffs. Third, damages are sought for the ex-
penses which the parents have been, and will be subjected to as a result of
the unexpected conception.
Because the cause of action is relatively novel, its development prior to
Sherlock will be briefly traced. Due to the infrequency of voluntary sterili-
zation in the past, the first case did not appear until 1934. In Christensen
v. Thornby ,6 the plaintiff husband sought damages for his anxiety and ex-
pense accompanying the birth of a normal child despite the performance
of a vasectomy by the defendant. 7 The complaint was based on a deceit
theory stemming from the doctor's representations concerning efficacy of
the sterilization.8 The court's opinion disallowing recovery turned on the
lack of proof of deceit, and on the fact that the operation was undertaken
to spare the plaintiff's wife the strain of another birth, not to save the ex-
penses of pregnancy and delivery. Since the wife was not harmed, the court
concluded that the plaintiff had suffered no compensable damages. 9
Christensen did not deny, however, that a cause of action may exist for an
improperly performed sterilization, and therein lies its importance.
In Shaheen v. Knight,10 the question of damages for wrongful concep-
tion was considered at greater length. The plaintiffs claimed breach of
contract, and sought damages for the expense of maintaining their child.
Although the opinion indicated that a contract to sterilize is not against
public policy, even if sought solely for economic reasons, plaintiffs were
denied recovery because of the court's views of public policy.II This con-
clusion was reached despite the fact that unlike Christensen the Shaheens
primarily desired to prevent the financial burden which additional
children would bring. The court reasoned that to "allow damages .. .
Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 356 N.E.2d 496 (1976). Since damages
sought by the parents do not include the child's mere existence, but only some
compensation for expenses they are subjected to because of the child, the policy
arguments mentioned above do not apply. The courts have been much more
receptive to the parents' claims, often allowing them at least in part, while dis-
missing the child's wrongful life claim when the two arise in the same case. See,
e.g., Dumer v. Saint Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 776, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975).
6. 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934).
7. Although it is somewhat unusual for a husband to bring suit alone in
such situation, at least one case suggests that he may have a separate right to
recover. Milde v. Leigh, 75 N.D. 418, 28 N.W.2d 530 (1947).
8. The plaintiff alleged that the physician had promised a sterile result
from the operation. 192 Minn. at 124, 255 N.W.at 621.
9. The court's feelings were made even clearer by a dictum: "As well might
the plaintiff charge defendant with the cost of nurture and education of the child
during its minority." Id. at 126, 255 N.W. at 623.
10. 11 Pa. D. & C. 2d 41 (1957).
11. The court noted that the purpose of marriage is procreation and that "to
allow damages for the normal birth of a normal child is foreign to the universal
sentiment of the people." Id. at 45.
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would mean that the physician would have to pay for the fun, joy, and
affection which plaintiff Shaheen will have in the rearing and educating of
[plaintiff's] fifth child."1 2 Shaheen went on to hold that the advantages of
having a child always outweigh the costs entailed, and that such "over-
riding benefit" entirely bars recovery for the costs of raising a child. Is
Custodio v. Bauer 4 took a contrary stand on the damages issue.' 5 The
plaintiff's wife, for predominantly socio-economic reasons, 16 underwent a
sterilization operation. Despite this procedure, she conceived an eleventh
child. She and her husband, brought suit against the surgeons prior to the
birth on a number of grounds, seeking recovery for medical expenses, the
wife's pain and suffering, and the expenses of raising the child. Because
the case was remanded for trial, the court did not actually award damages
in Custodio. However, the opinion clearly indicated dislike of the conclu-
sion that the birth and rearing of a normal child as a result of a negligently
performed sterilization could never result in compensable damages to the
12. Id. at 45, 46.
13. See also Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124, 128 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927 (1974). ("Rather than attempt to value these intangi-
ble benefits, our courts have simply determined that. . . these benefits to the
parents outweigh their economic loss. . . .") Some doubt is cast on this result,
however, because in the same year the Texas Supreme Court remanded a similar
case for trial without suggesting that no cause of action was stated. Hays v. Hall,
488 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. 1973). Further, two later cases seem to have eroded Ter-
rell. InJacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975), the court carefully dis-
tinguished Terrell in allowing recovery of medical expenses related to the treat-
ment of a deformed child, and Garwood v. Locke, 552 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1977), held that at least the expenses of the pregnancy and delivery could be
recovered in a wrongful conception action.
Cf. Rieck v. Medical Protec. Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974)
(alleging physician's negligence for failure to detect a pregnancy in time for an
abortion to be performed; court adopted overriding benefit theory).
Often courts have been careful to limit their decision to other aspects of such
cases, thereby avoiding the damages question. See Peters v. Gelb, 303 A.2d 685
(Del. Super. Ct. 1973) (status of expert witness); Jackson v. Anderson, 230 So. 2d
503 (Fla. App. 1970) (recognizing the parents' cause of action without discussion
of damages); Vilord v. Jenkins, 226 So. 2d 245 (Fla. App. 1969) (decision on stat-
ute of limitations question); Doerr v. Villate, 74 Ill. App. 2d 332, 220 N.E.2d 767
(1966) (same); Hackworth v. Hart, 474 S.W.2d 377 (Ky. 1971) (same); Ball v.
Mudge, 64 Wash. 2d 247, 391 P.2d 201 (1964) (decision on sufficiency of plain-
tiff's evidence).
14. 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967).
15. Prior cases had apparently indicated some sympathy for an award of
damages for wrongful conception, but none actually held so. See West v. Under-
wood, 132 NJ.L. 325, 40 A.2d 610 (1945) (complications from a botched
bilateral tubal ligation; the court stated that the plaintiffs should recover for any
expense or loss due to the surgeon's negligence). See also Milde v. Leigh, 75 N.D.
418, 28 N.W.2d 530 (1947) (considering husband's damages).
16. In general, sterilizations may be divided into two types depending on the
motive for the operation. Those motivated by medical considerations are termed
"therapeutic," while those motivated by social or economic reasons are "elective."
Note, Elective Sterilization, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 415, 416 (1965).
592 [Vol. 44
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parents.' 7 Ironically, as in earlier opinions, Custodio relied on "public
policy" to support its conclusions, but the public policy was that sup-
porting birth control, not procreation.
In Troppi v. Scarf,'8 recovery was allowed where pregnancy resulted
after the defendant pharmacist negligently filled Mrs. Troppi's prescrip-
tion for birth control pills with tranquilizers.' 9 The court rejected the
"overriding benefit theory," and instead developed the "benefit rule": ex-
penses incurred by plaintiffs should be reduced by the benefits conferred
by the birth.20
From a consideration of the cases to date it is evident that policy argu-
ments are heavily relied on in the argument and resolution of wrongful
conception cases. A review of the competing arguments advanced will pro-
vide tools for advocates and an understanding of the interests involved.
Opponents who would bar the cause of action entirely contend that sterili-
zation operations violate public policy, and that the plaintiff should not be
recompensed for such a violation. 2' In fact, a few states formerly had
statutes22 forbidding non-therapeutic sterilization, but none are in effect
today. 23 Perhaps this is why courts have flatly rejected the anti-sterilization
17. The court observed that if the "change in the family status can be
measured economically it should be as compensable as the [other] losses." Id. at
323-24, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 476.
18. 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971).
19. Space does not permit discussion of the liability of pharmacists and drug
companies for the ineffectiveness of contraceptive products, an important area
which differs greatly from that involving physicians. See Comment, Strict Liabil-
ity: "A Lady in Waiting"for Wrongful Birth Cases, 11 CAL.-W. L. REV. 136
(1974); Note, Liability for Failure of Contraceptive Devices, 3 RUT.-CAM. L.J.
489 (1972); Comment, up Against the (Uterine) Wall: An Analysis of the Liabil-
ity for Birth Control Products Manufacturers, 2 S. ILL. U.L.J. 498 (1976).
20. Between the groups of cases granting all expenses and those denying
recovery entirely are other cases which would allow recovery of some expenses. See
Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757 (Del. Super. 1974) (recovery limited to ex-
penses of the unexpected pregnancy); Garwood v. Locke, 552 S.W.2d 892 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1977) (would permit at least recovery of expenses of pregnancy and
delivery); Dumer v. Saint Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372
(1975). Cf. Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975) (recovery of expenses
reasonably related to child's defects after physician failed to diagnose mother's
rubella).
21. See, e.g., Shaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C. 2d41, 42. Cf. Anonymous
v. Hospital, 33 Conn. Supp. 126, 366 A.2d 204 (1976) (rejecting the related argu-
ment that the award of damages would be a violation of public policy).
22. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-33 (West 1960) (repealed by 1969 Conn.
Pub. Acts 828, § 214, effective 1971); KAN. STAT. § 76-155 (repealed by 1965
Kan. Sess. Laws, ch. 477, § 1); UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-10-12 (Smith 1953). In
general, these statutes outlawed all sterilizations except those for "medical neces-
sity."
23. Although the Utah statute remains in force it has been judicially re-
stricted, applying only to institutionalized persons. Parker v. Rampton, 28 Utah
2d 36, 497 P.2d 848 (1972).
A Missouri Attorney General's opinion formerly indicated that the general
1979]
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public policy argument, whether directed to therapeutic or elective sterili-
zation.
Closely related is a second assertion that public policy favors procrea-
tion; the function of the family is to produce and raise children.2 4 While a
few early cases such as Shaheen were influenced by this approach, it is not
popular now. Indeed it now appears that family planning and birth con-
trol have been recognized by the courts and accorded a high degree of pro-
tection.2 5 In addition, many legislatures have authorized and supported
birth control, including voluntary sterilization.2 6
A third argument made is that the unexpected child will be irrepar-
ably damaged if suits for wrongful conception are allowed.27 That is, when
the child learns that he is "accidental," and that his parents sued a doctor
or pharmacist "because they didn't want him," he will become an "emo-
tional bastard." 28 Indeed, it has been forcefully argued that any assertion
that a child is not wanted should not be allowed.2 9 It is not clear, however,
that damage will result to a child, and even if it does, "[t]he emotional in-
jury to the child can be no greater than that to be found in many families
where 'planned parenthood' has not followed the blueprint. 3 0 In answer it
law on mayhem, presently RSMo § 559.200 (1969), applied to voluntary steriliza-
tion. MO. ATT'Y GEN. OP. No. 62 (1946) (Miller). This has been writhdrawn by a
subsequent opinion concluding that "Missouri law does not prohibit the perfor-
mance of voluntary contraceptive human sterilization... ." MO. ATT'Y GEN. OP.
No. 393 (1971) (Domke).
However, some statutes still regulate such operations closely. See, e.g., VA.
CODE. §§ 33-423, 32-426-27 (1973) (regulating where and by whom sterilizations
may be performed; requiring written request).
24. Cf. Matchin v. Matchin, 6 Pa. 332 (1847) (purpose of marriage is pro-
creation).
25. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973);
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965); McCabe v. Nassau County Med. Center, 453 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1971);
Jessin v. County of Shasta, 274 Cal. App. 2d 737, 79 Cal. Rptr. 359 (1969).
26. A number of governmental programs, both state and federal, encour-
age family planning and contraception. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 300-300a
(authorizing population research and family planning services); ALASKA STAT.§ 18.05.035 (1962); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 295.1 (West Supp. 1979);
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 99-3101 to 3109 (Harrison 1976); NEV. REV. STAT. § 422.235
(1963).
Several states have laws expressly authorizing voluntary sterilization. See,
e.g., ORE. REV. STAT. § 435.305 (1969).
27. See Note, The Birth of a Child Following an Ineffective Sterilization
Operation as Legal Damage, 9 UTAH L. REV. 808 (1965).
28. Id. at 812.
29. See Note, supra note 27 at 815; Jackson v. Anderson, 230 So. 2d 503,
503 (Fla. App. 1970) ("this child is not to be thought of as unwanted or unloved,
but as unplanned").
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should be pointed out that damages are not granted to compensate
parents for tolerating an unwanted, unloved child. Rather, they are
awarded to make up for the reduction in the family exchequer caused by
the additional child, wanted or not.31 It could even be said that a child who
was the subject of a wrongful conception recovery would have the satisfac-
tion of knowing he was paying his own way.
Defendants have often argued, although with little success, that either
the defendant's conduct was not the proximate cause of the unexpected
conception, 32 or the plaintiff's sexual relations constituted an intervening
cause which cut off the defendant's liability.33 As one court tersely ob-
served, "It is difficult to conceive how the very act, the consequences of
which the operation was designed to forestall, can be considered unfore-
seeable."3 4
Assuming that public policy allows the existence of a cause of action
for wrongful conception at all, the biggest problem becomes determining
the appropriate measure of damages. It has been argued that damages for
wrongful conception are so uncertain and speculative that they are
unmeasurable, and should therefore not be awarded.3 5 Of course, the dif-
ficulty of measuring damages is present in numerous types of cases. That
this fact alone should defeat an otherwise meritorious claim would be un-
just, particularly since similar damages are calculated and awarded in
child support and paternity suits.,3 6
A few defendants argued that plaintiffs should be compelled to miti-
gate their damages by either aborting the fetus or placing the child up for
adoption.3 7 Although the Shaheen court seemed favorably disposed to this
harsh suggestion, most later cases, including Sherlock, 3 took a dim view of
the idea.3 9 Strong social and psychological arguments weigh against re-
31. Id. at 323-24, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 476-77.
32. Id.
33. See Bishop v. Byrne, 265 F. Supp. 460 (S.D. W. Va. 1967); Ball v.
Mudge, 64 Wash. 2d 247, 391 P.2d 201 (1964).
34. Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 316-17, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463,
472 (1967).
35. See Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967). "In order to
determine their compensatory damages, a court would have to evaluate the
denial to [the parents] of the intangible, unmeasurable, and complex human
benefits of [parenthood] ... [which is] impossible... ."Id. at 29-30, 227 A.2d at
693.
36. "Although the specific ascertainment of damages in [this] area is diffi-
cult, that should not prevent their consideration. .... " Anonymous v. Hospital,
33 Conn. Supp. 126, 128, 366 A.2d 204, 206 (1976); "[M]ere uncertainty as to the
amount of damage should not preclude the right of recovery." Betancourt v.
Gaylor, 136 N.J. Super. 69, 76, 344 A.2d 336, 340 (1975).
37. See Shaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C. 2d at 46.
38. The court stated that "the refusal of a mother to submit to an abortion
or of the parents to give their child up for adoption should not be regarded as a
failure on the part of the parents to mitigate damages." 260 N.W.2d at 176.
39. The idea "is not consistent with the very stability of the family which the
1979]
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quiring the "mitigation" suggested, since to do so would force the parents
to choose between the child and the cause of action. To allow a negligent
physician to escape liability because plaintiffs are unwilling to give up a
child which they did not expect would be extreme. Support can be found,
however, for a requirement of mitigation to an extent to which a reason-
able person would not object. 40
Two basic approaches to the damage issue have arisen, with the cause
of action- the overriding benefit theory and the "weighing" or "balanc-
ing" test. Regarding the latter, however, which is the more widely ac-
cepted in recent cases, 41 exactly what is to be weighed is not clear. In
particular, there are differing interpretations of section 920 of the Restate-
ment of Torts:
Where the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the
plaintiff or to his property and in so doing has conferred upon the
plaintiff a special benefit to the interest which was harmed, the
value of the benefit conferred is considered in mitigation of the
damages, where this is equitable.42
Custodio took a narrow view of the term "interest," distinguishing parents'
interest in a child's society from economic interests in a child's potential
earnings. This approach would result in a smaller offset to damages con-
sisting solely of economic benefits, and thus a larger recovery for the plain-
tiffs. The Troppi court, on the other hand, considered all the benefits
conferred by the child, economic and emotional. 43 The Sherlock court
agreed, holding that the plaintiffs could recover the reasonable costs of
rearing the unplanned child subject to offsetting the value of the child's
aid, comfort, and society during the parents' life expectancy. 44 The court
[Shaheen] court relies on to support its views .... ." Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal.
App. 2d 303, 324, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 477 (1967).
40. See C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOKONTHELAWOFDAMAGES§ 35 (1935).
41. See, e.g., Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652
(1976); Anonymous v. Hospital, 33 Conn. Supp. 126, 366 A.2d 204 (1976);
Betancourt v. Gaylor, 136 N.J. Super. 69, 344 A.2d 336 (1975); Bowman v.
Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 356 N.E.2d 496 (1976). See also, Note, Damages for
Wrongful Birth, 21 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 34 (1972); Note, Redressing a Blessing:
The Question of Damages for Negligently Performed Sterilization Operations, 33
U. PITT. L. REV. 886 (1972); Note, Unplanned Parenthood and the Benefit
Rule, 8 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 159 (1971).
42. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 920 (1939) (emphasis added). This wording
is changed slightly in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1979) which
states:
When the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the plaintiff
or to his property and in so doing has conferred a special benefit to the in-
terest of the plaintiff that was harmed, the value of the benefit conferred
is considered in mitigation of damages, to the extent that this is equit-
able.
43. In our contemporary society, it seems unlikely that parents would derive
the tangible economic benefits children provided in an agrarian society.
44. 260 N.W.2d at 170-71.
596 [Vol. 44
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reasoned that the child's pecuniary benefits alone would not be a sufficient
offset, since such "benefits [would] be minimal during the child's minor-
ity."4 5
The success of a wrongful birth action in Missouri or the measure of
damages which would be awarded is uncertain, but a consideration of the
possible theories of recovery gives some indications. 46 Almost all cases in
other jurisdictions have been based at least in part on tort theories. The
most obvious basis for a claim is that the surgeon was negligent in his per-
formance of the sterilization. The birth of a child after an operation upon
either of the parents might appear to present a prima facie case of negli-
gence. However, proof of negligence would still be necessary, because even
if the operation was originally successful, in a small number of cases
"recanalization" occurs whereby the severed tubes grow together again
spontaneously.47 Thus, without negligence on the physician's part, the
patient could still become fertile. For this reason the theory is not often ad-
vanced.
A better theory, used with success in Sherlock, is that the physician was
negligent in his post-operative care of the patient.4 8 This could occur in at
least two ways. First, negligence could be found in failure to test semen
samples following the operation 9 or in incorrect testing. Some dispute ex-
isted regarding the necessity for such tests. At least one case held that they
were not necessary since evidence indicated that the procedure was not
45. Id. at 176, n.12.
46. This Note deals with the problems facing physicians in such cases. For
discussion of the theories advanced against others such as pharmacists and drug
manufacturers see authorities cited note 19 supra.
47. See Lombard, Vasectomy, 10 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 25 (1975). See also
Lane v. Cohen, 201 So. 2d 804 (Fla. App. 1967.) (holding mere failure of vasec-
tomy not sufficient proof of negligence).
48. It seems clear that a physician must use the due care that the case
demands in subsequent treatment. See, e.g., Reed v. Laughlin, 332 Mo. 424, 58
S.W.2d 440 (1933). Further, the physician-patient relationship continues until
the physician's services are no longer needed. Noren v. American School of
Osteopathy, 223 Mo. App. 278, 2 S.W.2d 215 (St. L. 1928).
49. The central question would of course be whether a physician of ordinary
skill, care, and prudence would perform such tests. If so, a physician who failed to
could be liable for malpractice. See Reed v. Laughlin, 332 Mo. 424, 58 S.W.2d
440 (1933) (physician impliedly contracts to use degree of skill and learning exer-
cised by ordinary members of his profession). See also Morgan v. Rosenberg, 370
S.W.2d 685 (St. L. Mo. App. 1963). The medical literature on vasectomy con-
tains a number of references to the need for post-operative testing of semen to in-
sure the success of the operation. See, e.g., Craft, Problems of Vasectomy, 214
PRACTITIONER 70, 73 (1975); Gue & Douglas, Vasectomy, 1 MED. J. AUST. 740,
742 (1976); Schmidt, Technics and Complications of Elective Vasectomy, 17 FER-
TILITY AND STERILITY 467, 480 (1966) ("The patient is cautioned that he is still
fertile and that he must use contraceptives until he has submitted 2 negative
semen specimens, 1 month part."); Strode, Technique of Vasectomyfor Steriliza-
tion, 37 J. UROL. 733, 734-35 (1937).
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professional custom, and that physicians followed various practices.5 0
However, knowledge of the failure of a percentage of sterilizations makes it
unlikely that a physician exercising skill and diligence would forego all
subsequent testing. Therefore, most jurisdictions have had little trouble in
finding negligence due to incorrect testing procedures. A physician simi-
larly could be found negligent in failing to recommend alternative con-
traception during the testing period.si
A final possibility among the tort theories would be to allege negli-
gence in the physician's failure to warn the patient that the operation
might not be successful, thereby rendering the patient's consent unin-
formed. The chance that such an operation would fail would probably not
be high enough to subject a physician to liability for battery by failing to
disclose it. However, such failure could constitute negligence. 2 The stan-
dard would be whether a physician of average skill, care, and prudence
would have so informed the patient. In Missouri the cases hold physicians
to a relatively low duty of disclosure. 3 To recover under a negligent failure
to warn theory the plaintiff would also have to show proximate cause, i.e.,
"a causal connection between the doctor's failure sufficiently to inform
and the injury for which recovery is sought."' 54 This two-fold burden of
proving negligence in warning and causation will be difficult for a plaintiff
to meet.
Although tort claims have appeared most often in wrongful concep-
tion cases, a plaintiff might also consider suing on a contract theory. In
50. Ball v. Mudge, 64 Wash. 2d 247, 391 P.2d 201 (1964).
51. See authorities cited note 49 supra.
52. It appears that Missouri chooses to treat lack of informed consent as
negligence, not battery. The duty to disclose information to the patient concern-
ing the risk is based on the likelihood and degree of danger. Mitchell v. Robinson,
334 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1960).
53. The Mitchell court quoted with approval the statement that "the doctor
owes a duty to his patient to make reasonable disclosure of... some of the more
probable consequences and difficulties inherent in the proposed operation." (em-
phasis deleted) Mitchell v. Robinson, 334 S.W.2d 11, 18 (Mo. 1960), quoting
McCoid, A Reappraisal of Liability for Unauthorized Medical Treatment, 41
MINN. L. REV. 381, 427 (1957). It seems unlikely that the failure of such an
operation would be considered probable enough to require disclosure. However,
it has been held elsewhere that a patient undergoing tubal ligation could attach
material significance to the slight risk that the operation would be unsuccessful.
Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. 432, 379 A.2d 1014 (1977), reversing, 34 Md. App. 213,
367 A.2d 525 (1976).
54. Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668, 676 (Mo. 1965). The plaintiff has the
burden of showing that a reasonable person would not have consented to the
operation had this risk been revealed. This is the usual objective standard as used
in most states, See, e.g., Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 502
P.2d 1 (1972). However, expert testimonyis necessary to create a submissible case
as to this informed consent question, a mere claim by the plaintiff not being
enough. Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d at 674-75. See also Hart v. Steele, 416
S.W.2d 927 (Mo. 1967); Bateman v. Rosenberg, 525 S.W.2d 753 (Mo. App. D.
St. L. 1975) (allowing defendant physician's admissions for such purpose).
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RECENT CASES
Missouri it has been held that a physician does not warrant a cure merely
by taking a case. 5 Nor may mere failure of result in a particular case be
taken as evidence that the physician breached his contract with the pa-
tient.5 6 Therefore, in the absence of an express promise as to a sterile
result, it appears that the plaintiff would have difficulty recovering in a
contract action for an unsuccessful sterilization operation.
The legality of such a promise by a physician, and its enforceability
once made, would be additional questions. Although there are no recent
cases on the issue, early Missouri cases hold that a doctor may validly bind
himself to a higher duty than the ordinary standard, 57 although there
would appear to be little incentive to do so.
In conclusion, it appears that the increased popularity of surgical
sterilization as a contraceptive method may eventually give rise to wrong-
ful conception claims in every state. In Missouri, no substantial obstacle to
such a claim is apparent at present, but the allowance of the cause of ac-
tion and the recoverability of damages would both be issues of first impres-
sion. Established medical malpractice and general negligence theories
would support the acceptance of both. Finally, the public policy favoring
family planning would be frustrated if a cause of action for damages for
the birth of an unplanned child resulting from ineffective sterilization
were denied.
LYNN G. CAREY
55. See Vanhoover v. Berghoff, 90 Mo. 487, 3 S.W. 72 (1887); Logan v.
Field, 75 Mo. App. 594 (K.C. 1898).
56. McDonald v. Crider, 272 S.W. 980 (K.C. Mo. App. 1925).
57. Vanhoover v. Berghoff, 90 Mo. 487, 491, 3 S.W. 72, 73 (1887).
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